feat: 초기 프로젝트 설정 및 룰.md 파일 추가

api.hyungi.net/node_modules/@simplewebauthn/server/script/registration/verifications/tpm/constants.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/**
+ * A whole lotta domain knowledge is captured here, with hazy connections to source
+ * documents. Good places to start searching for more info on these values are the
+ * following Trusted Computing Group TPM Library docs linked in the WebAuthn API:
+ *
+ * - https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-1-Architecture-01.38.pdf
+ * - https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf
+ * - https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-3-Commands-01.38.pdf
+ */
+/**
+ * 6.9 TPM_ST (Structure Tags)
+ */
+export declare const TPM_ST: {
+    [key: number]: string;
+};
+/**
+ * 6.3 TPM_ALG_ID
+ */
+export declare const TPM_ALG: {
+    [key: number]: string;
+};
+/**
+ * 6.4 TPM_ECC_CURVE
+ */
+export declare const TPM_ECC_CURVE: {
+    [key: number]: string;
+};
+type ManufacturerInfo = {
+    name: string;
+    id: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Sourced from https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/vendor-id-registry/
+ *
+ * Latest version:
+ * https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-TPM-Vendor-ID-Registry-Version-1.02-Revision-1.00.pdf
+ */
+export declare const TPM_MANUFACTURERS: {
+    [key: string]: ManufacturerInfo;
+};
+/**
+ * Match TPM public area curve ID's to `crv` numbers used in COSE public keys
+ */
+export declare const TPM_ECC_CURVE_COSE_CRV_MAP: {
+    [key: string]: number;
+};
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=constants.d.ts.map

api.hyungi.net/node_modules/@simplewebauthn/server/script/registration/verifications/tpm/constants.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"constants.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/registration/verifications/tpm/constants.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AACA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AAEH;;GAEG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE;IAAE,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAA;CAkB3C,CAAC;AAEF;;GAEG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE;IAAE,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAA;CAsC5C,CAAC;AAEF;;GAEG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,aAAa,EAAE;IAAE,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAA;CAUlD,CAAC;AAEF,KAAK,gBAAgB,GAAG;IACtB,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACZ,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE;IAAE,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAA;CAgChE,CAAC;AAEF;;GAEG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,0BAA0B,EAAE;IAAE,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAA;CAM/D,CAAC"}

api.hyungi.net/node_modules/@simplewebauthn/server/script/registration/verifications/tpm/constants.js

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+"use strict";
+// deno-lint-ignore-file no-dupe-keys
+/**
+ * A whole lotta domain knowledge is captured here, with hazy connections to source
+ * documents. Good places to start searching for more info on these values are the
+ * following Trusted Computing Group TPM Library docs linked in the WebAuthn API:
+ *
+ * - https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-1-Architecture-01.38.pdf
+ * - https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf
+ * - https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-3-Commands-01.38.pdf
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.TPM_ECC_CURVE_COSE_CRV_MAP = exports.TPM_MANUFACTURERS = exports.TPM_ECC_CURVE = exports.TPM_ALG = exports.TPM_ST = void 0;
+/**
+ * 6.9 TPM_ST (Structure Tags)
+ */
+exports.TPM_ST = {
+    0x00c4: 'TPM_ST_RSP_COMMAND',
+    0x8000: 'TPM_ST_NULL',
+    0x8001: 'TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS',
+    0x8002: 'TPM_ST_SESSIONS',
+    0x8014: 'TPM_ST_ATTEST_NV',
+    0x8015: 'TPM_ST_ATTEST_COMMAND_AUDIT',
+    0x8016: 'TPM_ST_ATTEST_SESSION_AUDIT',
+    0x8017: 'TPM_ST_ATTEST_CERTIFY',
+    0x8018: 'TPM_ST_ATTEST_QUOTE',
+    0x8019: 'TPM_ST_ATTEST_TIME',
+    0x801a: 'TPM_ST_ATTEST_CREATION',
+    0x8021: 'TPM_ST_CREATION',
+    0x8022: 'TPM_ST_VERIFIED',
+    0x8023: 'TPM_ST_AUTH_SECRET',
+    0x8024: 'TPM_ST_HASHCHECK',
+    0x8025: 'TPM_ST_AUTH_SIGNED',
+    0x8029: 'TPM_ST_FU_MANIFEST',
+};
+/**
+ * 6.3 TPM_ALG_ID
+ */
+exports.TPM_ALG = {
+    0x0000: 'TPM_ALG_ERROR',
+    0x0001: 'TPM_ALG_RSA',
+    0x0004: 'TPM_ALG_SHA',
+    // @ts-ignore 2300
+    0x0004: 'TPM_ALG_SHA1',
+    0x0005: 'TPM_ALG_HMAC',
+    0x0006: 'TPM_ALG_AES',
+    0x0007: 'TPM_ALG_MGF1',
+    0x0008: 'TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH',
+    0x000a: 'TPM_ALG_XOR',
+    0x000b: 'TPM_ALG_SHA256',
+    0x000c: 'TPM_ALG_SHA384',
+    0x000d: 'TPM_ALG_SHA512',
+    0x0010: 'TPM_ALG_NULL',
+    0x0012: 'TPM_ALG_SM3_256',
+    0x0013: 'TPM_ALG_SM4',
+    0x0014: 'TPM_ALG_RSASSA',
+    0x0015: 'TPM_ALG_RSAES',
+    0x0016: 'TPM_ALG_RSAPSS',
+    0x0017: 'TPM_ALG_OAEP',
+    0x0018: 'TPM_ALG_ECDSA',
+    0x0019: 'TPM_ALG_ECDH',
+    0x001a: 'TPM_ALG_ECDAA',
+    0x001b: 'TPM_ALG_SM2',
+    0x001c: 'TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR',
+    0x001d: 'TPM_ALG_ECMQV',
+    0x0020: 'TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A',
+    0x0021: 'TPM_ALG_KDF2',
+    0x0022: 'TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_108',
+    0x0023: 'TPM_ALG_ECC',
+    0x0025: 'TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER',
+    0x0026: 'TPM_ALG_CAMELLIA',
+    0x0040: 'TPM_ALG_CTR',
+    0x0041: 'TPM_ALG_OFB',
+    0x0042: 'TPM_ALG_CBC',
+    0x0043: 'TPM_ALG_CFB',
+    0x0044: 'TPM_ALG_ECB',
+};
+/**
+ * 6.4 TPM_ECC_CURVE
+ */
+exports.TPM_ECC_CURVE = {
+    0x0000: 'TPM_ECC_NONE',
+    0x0001: 'TPM_ECC_NIST_P192',
+    0x0002: 'TPM_ECC_NIST_P224',
+    0x0003: 'TPM_ECC_NIST_P256',
+    0x0004: 'TPM_ECC_NIST_P384',
+    0x0005: 'TPM_ECC_NIST_P521',
+    0x0010: 'TPM_ECC_BN_P256',
+    0x0011: 'TPM_ECC_BN_P638',
+    0x0020: 'TPM_ECC_SM2_P256',
+};
+/**
+ * Sourced from https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/vendor-id-registry/
+ *
+ * Latest version:
+ * https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-TPM-Vendor-ID-Registry-Version-1.02-Revision-1.00.pdf
+ */
+exports.TPM_MANUFACTURERS = {
+    'id:414D4400': { name: 'AMD', id: 'AMD' },
+    'id:414E5400': { name: 'Ant Group', id: 'ANT' },
+    'id:41544D4C': { name: 'Atmel', id: 'ATML' },
+    'id:4252434D': { name: 'Broadcom', id: 'BRCM' },
+    'id:4353434F': { name: 'Cisco', id: 'CSCO' },
+    'id:464C5953': { name: 'Flyslice Technologies', id: 'FLYS' },
+    'id:524F4343': { name: 'Fuzhou Rockchip', id: 'ROCC' },
+    'id:474F4F47': { name: 'Google', id: 'GOOG' },
+    'id:48504900': { name: 'HPI', id: 'HPI' },
+    'id:48504500': { name: 'HPE', id: 'HPE' },
+    'id:48495349': { name: 'Huawei', id: 'HISI' },
+    'id:49424d00': { name: 'IBM', id: 'IBM' },
+    'id:49424D00': { name: 'IBM', id: 'IBM' }, // Same ID for IBM as above, except the "D" is capitalized as per TPM spec
+    'id:49465800': { name: 'Infineon', id: 'IFX' },
+    'id:494E5443': { name: 'Intel', id: 'INTC' },
+    'id:4C454E00': { name: 'Lenovo', id: 'LEN' },
+    'id:4D534654': { name: 'Microsoft', id: 'MSFT' },
+    'id:4E534D20': { name: 'National Semiconductor', id: 'NSM' },
+    'id:4E545A00': { name: 'Nationz', id: 'NTZ' },
+    'id:4E534700': { name: 'NSING', id: 'NSG' },
+    'id:4E544300': { name: 'Nuvoton Technology', id: 'NTC' },
+    'id:51434F4D': { name: 'Qualcomm', id: 'QCOM' },
+    'id:534D534E': { name: 'Samsung', id: 'SMSN' },
+    'id:53454345': { name: 'SecEdge', id: 'SECE' },
+    'id:534E5300': { name: 'Sinosun', id: 'SNS' },
+    'id:534D5343': { name: 'SMSC', id: 'SMSC' },
+    'id:53544D20': { name: 'STMicroelectronics', id: 'STM' },
+    'id:54584E00': { name: 'Texas Instruments', id: 'TXN' },
+    'id:57454300': { name: 'Winbond', id: 'WEC' },
+    'id:5345414C': { name: 'Wisekey', id: 'SEAL' },
+    'id:FFFFF1D0': { name: 'FIDO Alliance', id: 'FIDO' }, // FIDO Conformance
+};
+/**
+ * Match TPM public area curve ID's to `crv` numbers used in COSE public keys
+ */
+exports.TPM_ECC_CURVE_COSE_CRV_MAP = {
+    TPM_ECC_NIST_P256: 1, // p256
+    TPM_ECC_NIST_P384: 2, // p384
+    TPM_ECC_NIST_P521: 3, // p521
+    TPM_ECC_BN_P256: 1, // p256
+    TPM_ECC_SM2_P256: 1, // p256
+};

api.hyungi.net/node_modules/@simplewebauthn/server/script/registration/verifications/tpm/parseCertInfo.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/**
+ * Cut up a TPM attestation's certInfo into intelligible chunks
+ */
+export declare function parseCertInfo(certInfo: Uint8Array): ParsedCertInfo;
+type ParsedCertInfo = {
+    magic: number;
+    type: string;
+    qualifiedSigner: Uint8Array;
+    extraData: Uint8Array;
+    clockInfo: {
+        clock: Uint8Array;
+        resetCount: number;
+        restartCount: number;
+        safe: boolean;
+    };
+    firmwareVersion: Uint8Array;
+    attested: {
+        nameAlg: string;
+        nameAlgBuffer: Uint8Array;
+        name: Uint8Array;
+        qualifiedName: Uint8Array;
+    };
+};
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=parseCertInfo.d.ts.map

api.hyungi.net/node_modules/@simplewebauthn/server/script/registration/verifications/tpm/parseCertInfo.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"parseCertInfo.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/registration/verifications/tpm/parseCertInfo.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAGA;;GAEG;AACH,wBAAgB,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,cAAc,CAkElE;AAED,KAAK,cAAc,GAAG;IACpB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IAC5B,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACtB,SAAS,EAAE;QACT,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;QAClB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QACnB,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QACrB,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;KACf,CAAC;IACF,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE;QACR,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAChB,aAAa,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;QAC1B,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;QACjB,aAAa,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;KAC3B,CAAC;CACH,CAAC"}

api.hyungi.net/node_modules/@simplewebauthn/server/script/registration/verifications/tpm/parseCertInfo.js

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.parseCertInfo = parseCertInfo;
+const constants_js_1 = require("./constants.js");
+const index_js_1 = require("../../../helpers/iso/index.js");
+/**
+ * Cut up a TPM attestation's certInfo into intelligible chunks
+ */
+function parseCertInfo(certInfo) {
+    let pointer = 0;
+    const dataView = index_js_1.isoUint8Array.toDataView(certInfo);
+    // Get a magic constant
+    const magic = dataView.getUint32(pointer);
+    pointer += 4;
+    // Determine the algorithm used for attestation
+    const typeBuffer = dataView.getUint16(pointer);
+    pointer += 2;
+    const type = constants_js_1.TPM_ST[typeBuffer];
+    // The name of a parent entity, can be ignored
+    const qualifiedSignerLength = dataView.getUint16(pointer);
+    pointer += 2;
+    const qualifiedSigner = certInfo.slice(pointer, pointer += qualifiedSignerLength);
+    // Get the expected hash of `attsToBeSigned`
+    const extraDataLength = dataView.getUint16(pointer);
+    pointer += 2;
+    const extraData = certInfo.slice(pointer, pointer += extraDataLength);
+    // Information about the TPM device's internal clock, can be ignored
+    const clock = certInfo.slice(pointer, pointer += 8);
+    const resetCount = dataView.getUint32(pointer);
+    pointer += 4;
+    const restartCount = dataView.getUint32(pointer);
+    pointer += 4;
+    const safe = !!certInfo.slice(pointer, pointer += 1);
+    const clockInfo = { clock, resetCount, restartCount, safe };
+    // TPM device firmware version
+    const firmwareVersion = certInfo.slice(pointer, pointer += 8);
+    // Attested Name
+    const attestedNameLength = dataView.getUint16(pointer);
+    pointer += 2;
+    const attestedName = certInfo.slice(pointer, pointer += attestedNameLength);
+    const attestedNameDataView = index_js_1.isoUint8Array.toDataView(attestedName);
+    // Attested qualified name, can be ignored
+    const qualifiedNameLength = dataView.getUint16(pointer);
+    pointer += 2;
+    const qualifiedName = certInfo.slice(pointer, pointer += qualifiedNameLength);
+    const attested = {
+        nameAlg: constants_js_1.TPM_ALG[attestedNameDataView.getUint16(0)],
+        nameAlgBuffer: attestedName.slice(0, 2),
+        name: attestedName,
+        qualifiedName,
+    };
+    return {
+        magic,
+        type,
+        qualifiedSigner,
+        extraData,
+        clockInfo,
+        firmwareVersion,
+        attested,
+    };
+}

api.hyungi.net/node_modules/@simplewebauthn/server/script/registration/verifications/tpm/parsePubArea.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/**
+ * Break apart a TPM attestation's pubArea buffer
+ *
+ * See 12.2.4 TPMT_PUBLIC here:
+ * https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-00.96-130315.pdf
+ */
+export declare function parsePubArea(pubArea: Uint8Array): ParsedPubArea;
+type ParsedPubArea = {
+    type: 'TPM_ALG_RSA' | 'TPM_ALG_ECC';
+    nameAlg: string;
+    objectAttributes: {
+        fixedTPM: boolean;
+        stClear: boolean;
+        fixedParent: boolean;
+        sensitiveDataOrigin: boolean;
+        userWithAuth: boolean;
+        adminWithPolicy: boolean;
+        noDA: boolean;
+        encryptedDuplication: boolean;
+        restricted: boolean;
+        decrypt: boolean;
+        signOrEncrypt: boolean;
+    };
+    authPolicy: Uint8Array;
+    parameters: {
+        rsa?: RSAParameters;
+        ecc?: ECCParameters;
+    };
+    unique: Uint8Array;
+};
+type RSAParameters = {
+    symmetric: string;
+    scheme: string;
+    keyBits: number;
+    exponent: number;
+};
+type ECCParameters = {
+    symmetric: string;
+    scheme: string;
+    curveID: string;
+    kdf: string;
+};
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=parsePubArea.d.ts.map

api.hyungi.net/node_modules/@simplewebauthn/server/script/registration/verifications/tpm/parsePubArea.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"parsePubArea.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/registration/verifications/tpm/parsePubArea.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAGA;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,aAAa,CAyG/D;AAED,KAAK,aAAa,GAAG;IACnB,IAAI,EAAE,aAAa,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC;IACpC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,gBAAgB,EAAE;QAChB,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;QAClB,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;QACjB,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;QACrB,mBAAmB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;QAC7B,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;QACtB,eAAe,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;QACzB,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;QACd,oBAAoB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;QAC9B,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;QACpB,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;QACjB,aAAa,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;KACxB,CAAC;IACF,UAAU,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACvB,UAAU,EAAE;QACV,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC;QACpB,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC;KACrB,CAAC;IACF,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;CACpB,CAAC;AAEF,KAAK,aAAa,GAAG;IACnB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAClB,CAAC;AAEF,KAAK,aAAa,GAAG;IACnB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACb,CAAC"}

api.hyungi.net/node_modules/@simplewebauthn/server/script/registration/verifications/tpm/parsePubArea.js

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.parsePubArea = parsePubArea;
+const constants_js_1 = require("./constants.js");
+const index_js_1 = require("../../../helpers/iso/index.js");
+/**
+ * Break apart a TPM attestation's pubArea buffer
+ *
+ * See 12.2.4 TPMT_PUBLIC here:
+ * https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-00.96-130315.pdf
+ */
+function parsePubArea(pubArea) {
+    let pointer = 0;
+    const dataView = index_js_1.isoUint8Array.toDataView(pubArea);
+    const type = constants_js_1.TPM_ALG[dataView.getUint16(pointer)];
+    pointer += 2;
+    const nameAlg = constants_js_1.TPM_ALG[dataView.getUint16(pointer)];
+    pointer += 2;
+    // Get some authenticator attributes(?)
+    // const objectAttributesInt = pubArea.slice(pointer, (pointer += 4)).readUInt32BE(0);
+    const objectAttributesInt = dataView.getUint32(pointer);
+    pointer += 4;
+    const objectAttributes = {
+        fixedTPM: !!(objectAttributesInt & 1),
+        stClear: !!(objectAttributesInt & 2),
+        fixedParent: !!(objectAttributesInt & 8),
+        sensitiveDataOrigin: !!(objectAttributesInt & 16),
+        userWithAuth: !!(objectAttributesInt & 32),
+        adminWithPolicy: !!(objectAttributesInt & 64),
+        noDA: !!(objectAttributesInt & 512),
+        encryptedDuplication: !!(objectAttributesInt & 1024),
+        restricted: !!(objectAttributesInt & 32768),
+        decrypt: !!(objectAttributesInt & 65536),
+        signOrEncrypt: !!(objectAttributesInt & 131072),
+    };
+    // Slice out the authPolicy of dynamic length
+    const authPolicyLength = dataView.getUint16(pointer);
+    pointer += 2;
+    const authPolicy = pubArea.slice(pointer, pointer += authPolicyLength);
+    // Extract additional curve params according to type
+    const parameters = {};
+    let unique = Uint8Array.from([]);
+    if (type === 'TPM_ALG_RSA') {
+        const symmetric = constants_js_1.TPM_ALG[dataView.getUint16(pointer)];
+        pointer += 2;
+        const scheme = constants_js_1.TPM_ALG[dataView.getUint16(pointer)];
+        pointer += 2;
+        const keyBits = dataView.getUint16(pointer);
+        pointer += 2;
+        const exponent = dataView.getUint32(pointer);
+        pointer += 4;
+        parameters.rsa = { symmetric, scheme, keyBits, exponent };
+        /**
+         * See 11.2.4.5 TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA here:
+         * https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-00.96-130315.pdf
+         */
+        // const uniqueLength = pubArea.slice(pointer, (pointer += 2)).readUInt16BE(0);
+        const uniqueLength = dataView.getUint16(pointer);
+        pointer += 2;
+        unique = pubArea.slice(pointer, pointer += uniqueLength);
+    }
+    else if (type === 'TPM_ALG_ECC') {
+        const symmetric = constants_js_1.TPM_ALG[dataView.getUint16(pointer)];
+        pointer += 2;
+        const scheme = constants_js_1.TPM_ALG[dataView.getUint16(pointer)];
+        pointer += 2;
+        const curveID = constants_js_1.TPM_ECC_CURVE[dataView.getUint16(pointer)];
+        pointer += 2;
+        const kdf = constants_js_1.TPM_ALG[dataView.getUint16(pointer)];
+        pointer += 2;
+        parameters.ecc = { symmetric, scheme, curveID, kdf };
+        /**
+         * See 11.2.5.1 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER here:
+         * https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-00.96-130315.pdf
+         */
+        // Retrieve X
+        const uniqueXLength = dataView.getUint16(pointer);
+        pointer += 2;
+        const uniqueX = pubArea.slice(pointer, pointer += uniqueXLength);
+        // Retrieve Y
+        const uniqueYLength = dataView.getUint16(pointer);
+        pointer += 2;
+        const uniqueY = pubArea.slice(pointer, pointer += uniqueYLength);
+        unique = index_js_1.isoUint8Array.concat([uniqueX, uniqueY]);
+    }
+    else {
+        throw new Error(`Unexpected type "${type}" (TPM)`);
+    }
+    return {
+        type,
+        nameAlg,
+        objectAttributes,
+        authPolicy,
+        parameters,
+        unique,
+    };
+}

api.hyungi.net/node_modules/@simplewebauthn/server/script/registration/verifications/tpm/verifyAttestationTPM.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+import type { AttestationFormatVerifierOpts } from '../../verifyRegistrationResponse.js';
+export declare function verifyAttestationTPM(options: AttestationFormatVerifierOpts): Promise<boolean>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=verifyAttestationTPM.d.ts.map

api.hyungi.net/node_modules/@simplewebauthn/server/script/registration/verifications/tpm/verifyAttestationTPM.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"verifyAttestationTPM.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/registration/verifications/tpm/verifyAttestationTPM.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAUA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,6BAA6B,EAAE,MAAM,qCAAqC,CAAC;AAuBzF,wBAAsB,oBAAoB,CACxC,OAAO,EAAE,6BAA6B,GACrC,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CA+VlB"}

api.hyungi.net/node_modules/@simplewebauthn/server/script/registration/verifications/tpm/verifyAttestationTPM.js

@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyAttestationTPM = verifyAttestationTPM;
+const asn1_schema_1 = require("@peculiar/asn1-schema");
+const asn1_x509_1 = require("@peculiar/asn1-x509");
+const decodeCredentialPublicKey_js_1 = require("../../../helpers/decodeCredentialPublicKey.js");
+const cose_js_1 = require("../../../helpers/cose.js");
+const toHash_js_1 = require("../../../helpers/toHash.js");
+const convertCertBufferToPEM_js_1 = require("../../../helpers/convertCertBufferToPEM.js");
+const validateCertificatePath_js_1 = require("../../../helpers/validateCertificatePath.js");
+const getCertificateInfo_js_1 = require("../../../helpers/getCertificateInfo.js");
+const verifySignature_js_1 = require("../../../helpers/verifySignature.js");
+const index_js_1 = require("../../../helpers/iso/index.js");
+const validateExtFIDOGenCEAAGUID_js_1 = require("../../../helpers/validateExtFIDOGenCEAAGUID.js");
+const metadataService_js_1 = require("../../../services/metadataService.js");
+const verifyAttestationWithMetadata_js_1 = require("../../../metadata/verifyAttestationWithMetadata.js");
+const constants_js_1 = require("./constants.js");
+const parseCertInfo_js_1 = require("./parseCertInfo.js");
+const parsePubArea_js_1 = require("./parsePubArea.js");
+async function verifyAttestationTPM(options) {
+    const { aaguid, attStmt, authData, credentialPublicKey, clientDataHash, rootCertificates, } = options;
+    const ver = attStmt.get('ver');
+    const sig = attStmt.get('sig');
+    const alg = attStmt.get('alg');
+    const x5c = attStmt.get('x5c');
+    const pubArea = attStmt.get('pubArea');
+    const certInfo = attStmt.get('certInfo');
+    /**
+     * Verify structures
+     */
+    if (ver !== '2.0') {
+        throw new Error(`Unexpected ver "${ver}", expected "2.0" (TPM)`);
+    }
+    if (!sig) {
+        throw new Error('No attestation signature provided in attestation statement (TPM)');
+    }
+    if (!alg) {
+        throw new Error(`Attestation statement did not contain alg (TPM)`);
+    }
+    if (!(0, cose_js_1.isCOSEAlg)(alg)) {
+        throw new Error(`Attestation statement contained invalid alg ${alg} (TPM)`);
+    }
+    if (!x5c) {
+        throw new Error('No attestation certificate provided in attestation statement (TPM)');
+    }
+    if (!pubArea) {
+        throw new Error('Attestation statement did not contain pubArea (TPM)');
+    }
+    if (!certInfo) {
+        throw new Error('Attestation statement did not contain certInfo (TPM)');
+    }
+    const parsedPubArea = (0, parsePubArea_js_1.parsePubArea)(pubArea);
+    const { unique, type: pubType, parameters } = parsedPubArea;
+    // Verify that the public key specified by the parameters and unique fields of pubArea is
+    // identical to the credentialPublicKey in the attestedCredentialData in authenticatorData.
+    const cosePublicKey = (0, decodeCredentialPublicKey_js_1.decodeCredentialPublicKey)(credentialPublicKey);
+    if (pubType === 'TPM_ALG_RSA') {
+        if (!(0, cose_js_1.isCOSEPublicKeyRSA)(cosePublicKey)) {
+            throw new Error(`Credential public key with kty ${cosePublicKey.get(cose_js_1.COSEKEYS.kty)} did not match ${pubType}`);
+        }
+        const n = cosePublicKey.get(cose_js_1.COSEKEYS.n);
+        const e = cosePublicKey.get(cose_js_1.COSEKEYS.e);
+        if (!n) {
+            throw new Error('COSE public key missing n (TPM|RSA)');
+        }
+        if (!e) {
+            throw new Error('COSE public key missing e (TPM|RSA)');
+        }
+        if (!index_js_1.isoUint8Array.areEqual(unique, n)) {
+            throw new Error('PubArea unique is not same as credentialPublicKey (TPM|RSA)');
+        }
+        if (!parameters.rsa) {
+            throw new Error(`Parsed pubArea type is RSA, but missing parameters.rsa (TPM|RSA)`);
+        }
+        const eBuffer = e;
+        // If `exponent` is equal to 0x00, then exponent is the default RSA exponent of 2^16+1 (65537)
+        const pubAreaExponent = parameters.rsa.exponent || 65537;
+        // Do some bit shifting to get to an integer
+        const eSum = eBuffer[0] + (eBuffer[1] << 8) + (eBuffer[2] << 16);
+        if (pubAreaExponent !== eSum) {
+            throw new Error(`Unexpected public key exp ${eSum}, expected ${pubAreaExponent} (TPM|RSA)`);
+        }
+    }
+    else if (pubType === 'TPM_ALG_ECC') {
+        if (!(0, cose_js_1.isCOSEPublicKeyEC2)(cosePublicKey)) {
+            throw new Error(`Credential public key with kty ${cosePublicKey.get(cose_js_1.COSEKEYS.kty)} did not match ${pubType}`);
+        }
+        const crv = cosePublicKey.get(cose_js_1.COSEKEYS.crv);
+        const x = cosePublicKey.get(cose_js_1.COSEKEYS.x);
+        const y = cosePublicKey.get(cose_js_1.COSEKEYS.y);
+        if (!crv) {
+            throw new Error('COSE public key missing crv (TPM|ECC)');
+        }
+        if (!x) {
+            throw new Error('COSE public key missing x (TPM|ECC)');
+        }
+        if (!y) {
+            throw new Error('COSE public key missing y (TPM|ECC)');
+        }
+        if (!index_js_1.isoUint8Array.areEqual(unique, index_js_1.isoUint8Array.concat([x, y]))) {
+            throw new Error('PubArea unique is not same as public key x and y (TPM|ECC)');
+        }
+        if (!parameters.ecc) {
+            throw new Error(`Parsed pubArea type is ECC, but missing parameters.ecc (TPM|ECC)`);
+        }
+        const pubAreaCurveID = parameters.ecc.curveID;
+        const pubAreaCurveIDMapToCOSECRV = constants_js_1.TPM_ECC_CURVE_COSE_CRV_MAP[pubAreaCurveID];
+        if (pubAreaCurveIDMapToCOSECRV !== crv) {
+            throw new Error(`Public area key curve ID "${pubAreaCurveID}" mapped to "${pubAreaCurveIDMapToCOSECRV}" which did not match public key crv of "${crv}" (TPM|ECC)`);
+        }
+    }
+    else {
+        throw new Error(`Unsupported pubArea.type "${pubType}"`);
+    }
+    const parsedCertInfo = (0, parseCertInfo_js_1.parseCertInfo)(certInfo);
+    const { magic, type: certType, attested, extraData } = parsedCertInfo;
+    if (magic !== 0xff544347) {
+        throw new Error(`Unexpected magic value "${magic}", expected "0xff544347" (TPM)`);
+    }
+    if (certType !== 'TPM_ST_ATTEST_CERTIFY') {
+        throw new Error(`Unexpected type "${certType}", expected "TPM_ST_ATTEST_CERTIFY" (TPM)`);
+    }
+    // Hash pubArea to create pubAreaHash using the nameAlg in attested
+    const pubAreaHash = await (0, toHash_js_1.toHash)(pubArea, attestedNameAlgToCOSEAlg(attested.nameAlg));
+    // Concatenate attested.nameAlg and pubAreaHash to create attestedName.
+    const attestedName = index_js_1.isoUint8Array.concat([
+        attested.nameAlgBuffer,
+        pubAreaHash,
+    ]);
+    // Check that certInfo.attested.name is equals to attestedName.
+    if (!index_js_1.isoUint8Array.areEqual(attested.name, attestedName)) {
+        throw new Error(`Attested name comparison failed (TPM)`);
+    }
+    // Concatenate authData with clientDataHash to create attToBeSigned
+    const attToBeSigned = index_js_1.isoUint8Array.concat([authData, clientDataHash]);
+    // Hash attToBeSigned using the algorithm specified in attStmt.alg to create attToBeSignedHash
+    const attToBeSignedHash = await (0, toHash_js_1.toHash)(attToBeSigned, alg);
+    // Check that certInfo.extraData is equals to attToBeSignedHash.
+    if (!index_js_1.isoUint8Array.areEqual(extraData, attToBeSignedHash)) {
+        throw new Error('CertInfo extra data did not equal hashed attestation (TPM)');
+    }
+    /**
+     * Verify signature
+     */
+    if (x5c.length < 1) {
+        throw new Error('No certificates present in x5c array (TPM)');
+    }
+    // Pick a leaf AIK certificate of the x5c array and parse it.
+    const leafCertInfo = (0, getCertificateInfo_js_1.getCertificateInfo)(x5c[0]);
+    const { basicConstraintsCA, version, subject, notAfter, notBefore } = leafCertInfo;
+    if (basicConstraintsCA) {
+        throw new Error('Certificate basic constraints CA was not `false` (TPM)');
+    }
+    // Check that certificate is of version 3 (value must be set to 2).
+    if (version !== 2) {
+        throw new Error('Certificate version was not `3` (ASN.1 value of 2) (TPM)');
+    }
+    // Check that Subject sequence is empty.
+    if (subject.combined.length > 0) {
+        throw new Error('Certificate subject was not empty (TPM)');
+    }
+    // Check that certificate is currently valid
+    let now = new Date();
+    if (notBefore > now) {
+        throw new Error(`Certificate not good before "${notBefore.toString()}" (TPM)`);
+    }
+    // Check that certificate has not expired
+    now = new Date();
+    if (notAfter < now) {
+        throw new Error(`Certificate not good after "${notAfter.toString()}" (TPM)`);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Plumb the depths of the certificate's ASN.1-formatted data for some values we need to verify
+     */
+    const parsedCert = asn1_schema_1.AsnParser.parse(x5c[0], asn1_x509_1.Certificate);
+    if (!parsedCert.tbsCertificate.extensions) {
+        throw new Error('Certificate was missing extensions (TPM)');
+    }
+    let subjectAltNamePresent;
+    let extKeyUsage;
+    parsedCert.tbsCertificate.extensions.forEach((ext) => {
+        if (ext.extnID === asn1_x509_1.id_ce_subjectAltName) {
+            subjectAltNamePresent = asn1_schema_1.AsnParser.parse(ext.extnValue, asn1_x509_1.SubjectAlternativeName);
+        }
+        else if (ext.extnID === asn1_x509_1.id_ce_extKeyUsage) {
+            extKeyUsage = asn1_schema_1.AsnParser.parse(ext.extnValue, asn1_x509_1.ExtendedKeyUsage);
+        }
+    });
+    // Check that certificate contains subjectAltName (2.5.29.17) extension,
+    if (!subjectAltNamePresent) {
+        throw new Error('Certificate did not contain subjectAltName extension (TPM)');
+    }
+    // TPM-specific values are buried within `directoryName`, so first make sure there are values
+    // there.
+    if (!subjectAltNamePresent[0].directoryName?.[0].length) {
+        throw new Error('Certificate subjectAltName extension directoryName was empty (TPM)');
+    }
+    const { tcgAtTpmManufacturer, tcgAtTpmModel, tcgAtTpmVersion } = getTcgAtTpmValues(subjectAltNamePresent[0].directoryName);
+    if (!tcgAtTpmManufacturer || !tcgAtTpmModel || !tcgAtTpmVersion) {
+        throw new Error('Certificate contained incomplete subjectAltName data (TPM)');
+    }
+    if (!extKeyUsage) {
+        throw new Error('Certificate did not contain ExtendedKeyUsage extension (TPM)');
+    }
+    // Check that tcpaTpmManufacturer (2.23.133.2.1) field is set to a valid manufacturer ID.
+    if (!constants_js_1.TPM_MANUFACTURERS[tcgAtTpmManufacturer]) {
+        throw new Error(`Could not match TPM manufacturer "${tcgAtTpmManufacturer}" (TPM)`);
+    }
+    // Check that certificate contains extKeyUsage (2.5.29.37) extension and it must contain
+    // tcg-kp-AIKCertificate (2.23.133.8.3) OID.
+    if (extKeyUsage[0] !== '2.23.133.8.3') {
+        throw new Error(`Unexpected extKeyUsage "${extKeyUsage[0]}", expected "2.23.133.8.3" (TPM)`);
+    }
+    // Validate attestation statement AAGUID against leaf cert AAGUID
+    try {
+        await (0, validateExtFIDOGenCEAAGUID_js_1.validateExtFIDOGenCEAAGUID)(parsedCert.tbsCertificate.extensions, aaguid);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        const _err = err;
+        throw new Error(`${_err.message} (TPM)`);
+    }
+    // Run some metadata checks if a statement exists for this authenticator
+    const statement = await metadataService_js_1.MetadataService.getStatement(aaguid);
+    if (statement) {
+        try {
+            await (0, verifyAttestationWithMetadata_js_1.verifyAttestationWithMetadata)({
+                statement,
+                credentialPublicKey,
+                x5c,
+                attestationStatementAlg: alg,
+            });
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            const _err = err;
+            throw new Error(`${_err.message} (TPM)`);
+        }
+    }
+    else {
+        try {
+            // Try validating the certificate path using the root certificates set via SettingsService
+            await (0, validateCertificatePath_js_1.validateCertificatePath)(x5c.map(convertCertBufferToPEM_js_1.convertCertBufferToPEM), rootCertificates);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            const _err = err;
+            throw new Error(`${_err.message} (TPM)`);
+        }
+    }
+    // Verify signature over certInfo with the public key extracted from AIK certificate.
+    // In the wise words of Yuriy Ackermann: "Get Martini friend, you are done!"
+    return (0, verifySignature_js_1.verifySignature)({
+        signature: sig,
+        data: certInfo,
+        x509Certificate: x5c[0],
+        hashAlgorithm: alg,
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * Contain logic for pulling TPM-specific values out of subjectAlternativeName extension
+ */
+function getTcgAtTpmValues(root) {
+    const oidManufacturer = '2.23.133.2.1';
+    const oidModel = '2.23.133.2.2';
+    const oidVersion = '2.23.133.2.3';
+    let tcgAtTpmManufacturer;
+    let tcgAtTpmModel;
+    let tcgAtTpmVersion;
+    /**
+     * Iterate through the following potential structures:
+     *
+     * (Good, follows the spec)
+     * https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_IWG_EKCredentialProfile_v2p3_r2_pub.pdf (page 33)
+     * Name [
+     *   RelativeDistinguishedName [
+     *     AttributeTypeAndValue { type, value }
+     *   ]
+     *   RelativeDistinguishedName [
+     *     AttributeTypeAndValue { type, value }
+     *   ]
+     *   RelativeDistinguishedName [
+     *     AttributeTypeAndValue { type, value }
+     *   ]
+     * ]
+     *
+     * (Bad, does not follow the spec)
+     * Name [
+     *   RelativeDistinguishedName [
+     *     AttributeTypeAndValue { type, value }
+     *     AttributeTypeAndValue { type, value }
+     *     AttributeTypeAndValue { type, value }
+     *   ]
+     * ]
+     *
+     * Both structures have been seen in the wild and need to be supported
+     */
+    root.forEach((relName) => {
+        relName.forEach((attr) => {
+            if (attr.type === oidManufacturer) {
+                tcgAtTpmManufacturer = attr.value.toString();
+            }
+            else if (attr.type === oidModel) {
+                tcgAtTpmModel = attr.value.toString();
+            }
+            else if (attr.type === oidVersion) {
+                tcgAtTpmVersion = attr.value.toString();
+            }
+        });
+    });
+    return {
+        tcgAtTpmManufacturer,
+        tcgAtTpmModel,
+        tcgAtTpmVersion,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Convert TPM-specific SHA algorithm ID's with COSE-specific equivalents. Note that the choice to
+ * use ECDSA SHA IDs is arbitrary; any such COSEALG that would map to SHA-256 in
+ * `mapCoseAlgToWebCryptoAlg()`
+ *
+ * SHA IDs referenced from here:
+ *
+ * https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part2_Structures_pub.pdf
+ */
+function attestedNameAlgToCOSEAlg(alg) {
+    if (alg === 'TPM_ALG_SHA256') {
+        return cose_js_1.COSEALG.ES256;
+    }
+    else if (alg === 'TPM_ALG_SHA384') {
+        return cose_js_1.COSEALG.ES384;
+    }
+    else if (alg === 'TPM_ALG_SHA512') {
+        return cose_js_1.COSEALG.ES512;
+    }
+    throw new Error(`Unexpected TPM attested name alg ${alg}`);
+}